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# CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

## POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES

OF

### GREAT-BRITAIN

AND

### IRELAND,

AS THEY ARE CONNECTED WITH EACH OTHER;  
AND ON THE MOST PROBABLE MEANS OF EF-  
FECTING A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN  
THEM; TENDING TO PROMOTE  
THE INTERESTS OF BOTH,  
AND THE ADVANTAGES  
OF THE BRITISH  
EMPIRE.

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M.DCC.LXXXVII.

CONSTITUTION

OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA

AND

THE

CONSTITUTION

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## DEDICATION.

TO

His Grace the DUKE of LEINSTER.

IT is necessary for me to account to your Grace for the liberty I have taken, without your knowledge or approbation, of inscribing the following tract to you. The subject of it is such as lays claim to your notice: strongly attached as you must be to one country by residence, and to the other by the ties of affinity, friendships, and loyalty, I might, with propriety, solicit your protection to a work, the design of which is to promote the united welfare of both. But I am induced to desire, that you would extend this protection to these sheets, for another, and a more general reason. If they contain matter worthy the mutual regard of these kingdoms, it may be attended with general advantage to propagate the consideration of them, as far as the most

probable means of doing so will permit. In England, the public are sufficiently inclined to read and to canvass political disquisitions submitted to their inspection; in Ireland, it is probable, that some artificial helps are requisite, to introduce a diminutive treatise of this kind into observation. A name beloved and respected there, will excite a general attention to the work that bears it, and that might otherwise pass unnoticed by those for whose use it is composed.

Your Grace's elevated rank and character have, I acknowledge, pointed out your name to me, as the most likely to recommend this to the serious investigation of the temperate and unprejudiced in that country.

That I have not endeavoured to obtain Your Grace's consent for making this use of your credit with your countrymen, has been merely owing to my fears of intruding upon the political opinions of any man, and of seeming at least to attempt the gaining a sanction to that, for which I desire alone to be responsible.

THE AUTHOR.

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## CONSIDERATIONS, &c.

THE liberality of principle, as well in the commercial as in the political world, gradually diffusing itself over the opinions of mankind at present, and the late public discussion of the subject, afford strong inducements, and some encouragement, to treat freely of the actual relative situation of Great-Britain and Ireland, and to offer private sentiments upon measures calculated to procure advantages to each, and to promote the welfare of the empire; this situation is now very much altered by the late emancipation of Ireland; with respect to legislation, her rights, both externally and internally, are established and acknowledged; her power of trading with every country of the world is also recognized; she is not however wholly independent, in the political sense of the word; her crown is inseparably united with that of Great-Britain, where the Sovereign resides, and where one essential branch of her legislature acts: from hence result some consequences which must affect her independance: First, a direct negative on legislation: Secondly, a coercion by the executive power in Ireland; and, thirdly, a practical authority in matters of commerce. Whilst the constitution of Great-Britain and Ireland shall remain in its present state, the controul of the legislative over the executive power must continue to  
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influence the actions of the Sovereign in that country where he resides, and over that part of the united empire where he does not reside ; his Ministers must be accountable for all the measures of Government adopted in Ireland, as well as in Great-Britain, and therefore must take care to exercise the negative vested in the Crown, with respect to Ireland, with a proper regard to the welfare of the empire, at the head of which is placed the Sovereign of Great-Britain. The same principle must operate as to the direction of the executive power, either in Great-Britain or Ireland, and the former, possessing all the imperial strength of armies and fleets, she at the same time retains the ability of putting this executive power into motion at any time : her authority in matters of commerce, though not so immediately apparent, is nevertheless certain ; besides, the force of the direct negative on all Irish laws, and the executive coercion already mentioned, she can apply, without appearing to interfere with the legislation of Ireland, many powerful engines to controul and regulate her commerce ; all treaties with foreign states are at her disposal ; and at such a juncture as the present, when a system of universal traffic seems on the point of obtaining a distinguished rank in the politics of Europe, an authority of this kind must be of the most important consequence to the growing trade of a country circumstanced as Ireland is. Great-Britain has many foreign colonies and possessions, and over them an executive right ; she therefore may prevent Ireland from trading with a considerable portion of the world, or she may incumber this commerce with such imposts and regulations, as may render it not worth the seeking. On the other hand Great-Britain cannot be said, in  
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her present relative situation, to be wholly independent of Ireland; she is, without doubt, politically so, as to all the functions of Government, and the uncontrouled exercise of her constitutional powers but particularly, and with regard to the welfare, or even the existence of the empire, she is by no means so: If Great-Britain possesses wealth, and great constitutional strength, Ireland furnishes a numerous and hardy race of men, and enjoys many advantages in soil, and the position of the country, with respect both to the trade and the politics of Europe; whilst the hands of the one have been employed in traffic and manufactures, those of the other have been raised to conquer, or to protect; until within these very few years, Ireland could scarcely be considered in any other light than as a nation of soldiers and sailors, and it is astonishing what prodigious numbers of both issued from her during the last war: It has been calculated, that three-fourths of both armies in America were Irishmen, or their immediate descendants; and the body of sailors from that country, on board the fleets, were computed to a most enormous amount; a country of militia, that feels itself possessed of liberty, is a most dangerous neighbour to such a state as England; should, for the misfortune of both, any serious difference arise between them, in proportion to the poverty of such a country, will be its inclination to, and its leisure for, arms; and, until Ireland shall be enabled to turn the majority of her people to the same occupations that employ those of her sister kingdom, she must be regarded by Great-Britain with an eye of the strictest caution, and the most tender sense of prudent circumspection: It does not invalidate this, to say that England cannot be thus affected by Ireland, unless

unless the latter shall throw off allegiance to her Prince, and connection with her sister country, any more than it would invalidate the ground of England's possessing a legislative controul over Ireland, by saying that she could not without the utmost danger exercise it:—The capacity in both cases exists; and there is a possibility of its being led or urged into action:—It has become of more consequence to Great-Britain to preserve the utmost harmony with Ireland, than to retain all her other possessions, together with her friendship and connections with the rest of the world; united together they can support their importance in the scale of Europe; and, what is a much more interesting object to them, their liberties, though every colony, and every other ally should be torn from them; but once separated, or even estranged from each other, absolute ruin to both must ensue;—to a possibility of this event, each of them should look forward, and guard against its consequences, by all the means which a wise foresight can suggest; every possible cause of difference between the two countries should be, as soon as possible, removed; and the interests of both should be so closely knit together, and interwoven, as to render the chance of future dissention between them as small as the state of human nature can admit. In order to discover how this may be effected, it is necessary to consider the circumstances of the two countries in another light, the former being intended to manifest the critical necessity of consolidating the interests, and strengthening the bands of union that connect them. It will be proper to view the general outlines of the internal state of each, and afterwards, how far the peculiar circumstances of both can point out a method of promoting the great political design of establishing a  
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future concord between them, and at the same time advance the respective interests of the two countries, so far as may be consistent with this leading principle. Great-Britain is a country small in extent, and containing much fewer inhabitants than many others in Europe: But her people have been most profitably employed, in advancing the wealth and power of the nation, by following their own individual interests, secured to them through the blessings of liberty, and an excellent constitution; hence she has become the greatest naval, commercial and manufacturing country in Europe; and has been enabled to carry on wars, and to incur expences for the maintenance of her trade, both which, considering the limits of her own proper territory, will afford matter of the greatest astonishment to future ages. But, in the prosecution of this extraordinary course to wealth and greatness, she has incumbered herself with a debt, which, although it should not in the end sink her, must, for a long time, operate extremely to the disadvantage of her power, and retard her progress in improvement. The separation of her American colonies has, by contracting her dominions, and her market, rendered it the more necessary for her to cultivate with effect the remainder of her possessions, and to search for new marts to take off the surplus of her commodities; the latter has been found, so as, at least, to answer present exigency; and the former is now in a train of accomplishment.

Ireland, until the late emancipation of her legislature, must be practically considered as a province of Great-Britain, that retained just so much constitutional freedom as depended on the will, and corresponded with the views of the superior coun-



try: This will was exerted, and these views pursued, in the manner that was natural to a mercantile nation, apprehensive of a rival, and jealous in the extreme of her advancement; Ireland felt the effects of them through every department of her law, her revenue, and her trade; consequently, at the time of her liberation, she was neither a commercial nor a manufacturing nation.—She had no capital adequate to the support of the one character, nor industry to entitle her to the other: This must be taken in the general, as the solitary manufacture of linen, and the consequent trade, mostly carried on through the medium of Great-Britain, cannot be said to bestow on her either of those characters. Since the attainment of her freedom, Ireland has begun her course of manufactures and commerce; after so long a restraint she has naturally extended her views, as to both, much farther, perhaps, than either her abilities, or her present habits of industry can justify:—her manufacturing exertions have been productive of little more, hitherto, than grounds, however ill-founded, for the apprehensions of British artisans, and the effects, neither of them, nor of the extension of her trade, have been felt in the price, or in the emolument of land, when, did any such exist in a beneficial degree, they would have been experienced. A country where, from whatever cause, the general capital is small, must take a considerable time, through the slow and gradual encrease of that capital, before it can arrive at that stage of improvement which shall extend its influence throughout the community; and therefore, it was equally unreasonable, on the one hand, to look for the immediate gold and harvest, which the prospect of an enlargement of commerce seemed



seemed to promise in Ireland; and on the other, to indulge those extravagant jealousies, which the dread of manufacturing competition really produced in Great-Britain. Notwithstanding Ireland had, on her own proper account, no imperial disbursements to provide for, nor expensive arrangements of commerce to make, yet she has been, for many years past, gradually accumulating a debt, which, at present, her resources are wholly unable to discharge. This debt may, therefore, be considered as one part of the contribution of Ireland to the expences of the empire, whether by the maintenance of a large military force, or by whatever other mode Great-Britain was pleased to point out. After this review of the general circumstances of Great-Britain and Ireland, it remains to determine how those which are peculiar to each may lead to a method of promoting the great design of establishing a future concord between them, and at the same time advance the respective interests of both countries, so far as may be consistent with this leading principle. This is certainly one of the most arduous, as well as the most interesting topics, that can occur between two nations; it embraces not only the welfare, and future prosperity, but the very existence of both, and what very much adds to the difficulty is, that no precedent can be resorted to, which may serve as a guide to deliberation, there being not a single instance, in the history of mankind, opposite to the present subject of negotiation between the two kingdoms, in most of its principal circumstances. However, it may be construed into temerity, for an individual to propose his opinions upon a subject of this nice and critical nature, it must be productive of some benefit to

the community, to receive, from every man who has bestowed attention on this important transaction, the result of a temperate and mature consideration;—even his errors may bring forward enquiry, and conduct to truth; and, in this case, there is little chance of their misleading, because they must, in a discussion of such immense moment, be submitted to the correction of the best informed, and the wisest in both countries.

A stricter connection than at present obtains between Great-Britain and Ireland, situated as they are at present, can only be formed, with any prospect of stability, in either of two ways; by a legislative union, as between England and Scotland, or by a foederal compact. The first it would be extremely difficult to adjust, even although the circumstances of the two countries should admit of such a mode, without violating the leading principle of establishing a solid union of interests and affection. The constitutions of the two countries being precisely the same, as to representation, the number of representatives from Ireland, to be admitted into the British House of Commons, should naturally be supposed to bear a relative proportion to that which constitutes the elected body there, these two numbers are as three hundred to five hundred and fifty-eight, that is nearly as one to two:—one hundred and fifty, therefore, would be the least number to be sent from Ireland, which, together with the English Members, would amount to seven hundred; a body that must appear much too unwieldy for the proper functions of legislation. The situation of the places, from which those representatives should be chosen in Ireland, would occasion a most extraordinary ferment there. The value of representation has much increased since the time of the union between England and Scotland.

Boroughs

Boroughs in Ireland have got into the hands of the great families, and little less than a political civil war would accompany the measure of ascertaining a suitable division of them among the proprietors. It would be attended with still greater difficulty to determine the proportion of tax between the two nations. If this was to be struck according to the amount of their respective incomes, as they now stand, it would be rather less than as one to fifteen; so that a land-tax of four shillings in the pound, in Great-Britain, would carry little more than three pence in the pound in Ireland; or rather not so much, if into the account is taken the quit and crown rents, at present a land-tax on Ireland, and making the sum of sixty-five thousand pounds annually. It would be impossible for Ireland to bear the extraordinary imposts upon customs, &c. that Great Britain pays, and if a like proportion as that for the land-tax was to run through all the other departments of her revenue, it would so totally change the scheme of her finance, and produce so very little to Great-Britain, after providing for the most æconomical establishment, that such a rate must appear inequitable to her, and an attempt at any other would lead to endless controversy in the negociation between the two countries.

If we look to the House of Lords in Ireland, we shall there find more extraordinary impediments to a transfer of the legislative Power. The Lords, not being a representative body, may be deemed competent to abridge their power of voting and to alter their mode of legislating, so far as regards themselves, though even this may fairly admit a constitutional doubt; but a Bishop is a body corporate, and merely a tenant for life of the rights annexed to his see, an alienation of these rights is *ipso facto*



*facto* null and void, either legally, or constitutionally; and a surrender of them, by delegating a certain number to represent the whole, would be of itself enough to vitiate any national agreement of which it made a part. If, on the other hand, the entire bench of Bishops were admitted into the House of Lords of Great-Britain, the lay Lords would, no doubt, consider themselves as justly entitled to proportion of at least two to one in the number of their representatives. Sixty-six Lords from Ireland must therefore, according to this rule, take their seats in the new assembly of peers, that is, more than four times the number of the noble delegates from Scotland.

These obstacles, and many others that might be pointed out, may be regarded as formidable barriers against a legislative union, although the particular circumstances of both nations should admit of such a measure; but when they come to be deliberately weighed, and impartially considered, all the objections hitherto stated appear trifling, when compared with such as arise upon this view of the subject. The too great objects to be attained by the parties, are, the furtherance of mutual interests, and the permanent establishment of reciprocal affection. These ought to be regarded as essential to every species of argument that may be proposed for consideration. All measures submitted to the public as conducive to the accomplishment of so desirable a purpose, should be brought candidly and fairly to this test; let us therefore examine how the respective circumstances of the two countries can encourage an expectation of such a result from a legislative union; and, taking such separately, we may then be enabled to judge how far each may be affected.

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As to the advancement of mutual interest, if the two countries look on themselves as engaged in the pursuit of their own individual advantage, then the principal design of Great-Britain will naturally be, to gain a revenue from Ireland towards the support of her burdens, and to prevent her interference as a rival in the general market; but these two branches of the scheme are wholly incompatible with each other. In the present state of Irish commerce, no revenue can be derived from thence to Great-Britain worthy her attention; the increase of it must proceed from the improvement of industry, which will naturally produce the effects so much dreaded by manufacturing jealousy. If, on the other hand, they are actuated by those fair and liberal motives which regard their common prosperity, then the depression of Irish industry, or the injury of her general welfare, must directly militate against the prosecution of the design to which such motives gave birth; and that this will follow, in a most alarming degree, the measure of a legislative union, can very little be doubted, when the circumstances of Ireland, under such state, are fairly considered. The most conspicuous effect of this arrangement would be a certain and formidable drain of absentee cash from Ireland. At present this is computed at a million annually. The removal of her legislature, and consequently of the greater part of her nobility and gentry, together with the necessary attendance of suitors, either for political favours, or in the prosecution of legal business, would increase this to double the amount, at least. The only instance in which money cannot be considered as an article of commerce, is, when it is in this manner exported; no return whatever is made for it, and it may be reasonably

sonably computed, that a remittance of this kind is equivalent to the one half as much more in the course of trade; a drain, therefore, equal to three millions in mercantile transaction, would annually issue from Ireland. It may be questioned whether Great-Britain could long support the operation of such a balance against her. It is certain, that Ireland could not, and that every year after the first, must render her more and more unable to bear it. To this may be advanced the experience of to-day, when, altho' a million in cash is annually drawn from Ireland, yet the country is reported to be in a state of progressive improvement and industry, together with commerce, seems to have been extended. But it must be remarked that Ireland, as was before observed, on the first opening of her liberty to trade, has made unusual exertions to reap the benefit of it, and gone beyond her means, so that the appearance of this extraordinary advance may prove delusive, and what is of much greater importance in this question, the emigration of her nobility and principal families would occasion a void in the society, and a check to the cultivation and growing ability of the country, and would not only put a fatal stop to the future progress of improvement, but destroy the present effects of that cultivating spirit, now spreading itself over the whole kingdom. This leads to another and a very serious consideration. The loss of so much money continually drawn from a country, without a return, is very great in itself; but when men of rank and property are also drafted from it, the loss is augmented beyond the reach of computation. Wherever a man of fortune fixes his abode in the country, he creates a circulation of industry around him; every shilling he expends contributes to the introduction

duction of an habitual application to labour, from whence a profit arises. His money is the reward, and his example, not unfrequently the spur and direction, to the efforts of his neighbourhood: In Ireland, the capital of farmers is in general very inadequate to the purposes of an improved cultivation. The gentry apply themselves to this employment almost universally, and possessing the advantages of wealth and knowledge, they introduce by degrees a more intelligent and productive culture. It is not perhaps too bold an assertion, that Ireland has hitherto been enabled to support herself under the enormous remittance of cash to her absent proprietors, principally through the diffusive operation of the money expended, and the example of improvement exhibited, by the superior ranks of her inhabitants; and it cannot be doubted, that the emigration of these would be equivalent to the removal of a considerable quantity of the productive labour that constitutes the great basis of the national capital. Such a defalcation, suddenly occasioned, must prove fatal to that country. Those who have, perhaps, too cursorily, and without a due examination of the subject, entertained a favourable opinion of a legislative union, seem to rest their hopes of supplying this deficiency upon the introduction of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers. But where is to be found an instance of a country, improving in trade and industry, during the absence of three-fourths of its people of rank, and great landed property? Surely the removal of a very considerable branch of the home consumption, cannot hold forth a prospect of advantage in the establishment of manufactures. A trade of export, until these are founded, it would be impossible to expect; yet, upon such a visionary speculation are grounded the

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hopes of introducing the whole race of merchants and manufacturers, in the place of the nobility and gentry of Ireland. The interests of that kingdom would be not a little impaired, for a considerable length of time, by the ruin of its capital city. Its chief support is derived from the necessary resort of men of property, who are drawn thither either by business or pleasure. It possesses neither port nor situation for carrying on trade, and however it may be deemed advantageous in the end to disperse three or four hundred thousand people into other districts, better suited to the employments of a commercial nation, yet the annihilation of so great an home market as Dublin affords, before others to replace it have been gradually formed, must deeply affect the tender growth of trade and manufactures in that country. If these reflections are in any degree just, they demonstrate that the interests of Great-Britain and Ireland will be substantially injured by a legislative union. Let us in the next place consider, whether that measure is more likely to promote the other chief branch of the design, that is, an establishment of reciprocal affection between the two nations.

Great-Britain will receive into her legislature a large encrease of members; together with them, she will also be encumbered with their retainers; every man who looks up to them for provision, will naturally attend upon his principal to solicit his regards. Agreeable to the usage of the modern English policy, these must, sooner or later, share the favours of administration in one or other of the kingdoms. In Ireland, under the circumstances of a reduced establishment, the number of employments and douceurs will be much diminished, and in Great-Britain it is not very probable that they  
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can be proportionably encreased. It will become impossible to confer on the Irish members of either house, who must attend abroad the greater part of the year, any executive employments in their own country; so that whilst the expences of their living are very much enhanced, consequently their necessities are multiplied, the means of assisting them to defray the one, and of satisfying the other, must prove wholly insufficient, unless by a distribution of English employments among them. The circumstances of the two countries would then, as to this particular, undergo a total revolution. Instead of Englishmen possessing many of the lucrative offices in Ireland, we should have the Irish admitted to a considerable proportion of them in Great-Britain. But whether those concerned in political traffic on one side of the water, would submit as patiently to such an alarming intrusion, as those on the other have done, is a question of very great doubt. It is certain, however, that such a consequence would not tend to promote cordiality between the leading men of both countries, and it may properly be submitted to the experience of Ministers who have found the task of apportioning the rewards of government, not the least complicated and embarrassing of their functions, whether the discharge of this part of their duty might not be encreased, almost to an impossibility of practice in Great-Britain, by so great an enlargement of the sphere of its operation. Whatever difficulties may be hereby thrown upon the shoulders of politicians, and however unwelcome this influx of strangers might prove to their expectations and enjoyments in Great-Britain, the sentiments and feelings of the people in Ireland, would probably take an impression by no means favourable to the wishes of

the founders of this system, or to the welfare of the empire. The spirit of freedom, and the pride of the newly acquired constitution, are there in their full strength. The longer the people continue to possess, the more deeply they will become sensible of the importance of it, and the more tenacious will they be of what they had for such a length of time pursued, and what they have with so much earnestness at last retrieved. A scheme of legislation for them in another country, would ill suit the taste of a nation but too long oppressed by the peremptory dictates of Ministerial will, issued at a distance from their exigencies and their complaints. They will be led on every unpopular question to believe, that the great minority of Irish members, in the English parliament, has been over-ruled by the decisive majority of their associates, and it will be nearly impossible to convince the body of the people, that a virtual representation in Great-Britain is equivalent, in constitutional authority, to an actual representation in Ireland. Jealousies, discontents, murmurs, and perhaps commotions may arise, whilst the men of property and influence, whose talents should naturally be employed to convince and to assuage, must be far removed from the scene, and leave his necessary duty to men, who are uninformed of the real state of the matters in agitation, or who, in the character of Placemen, are ill adapted, to infuse any other than suspicions into the minds of those whom they labour to persuade. If to this concurrence of the probable causes of uneasiness in Ireland, there should be, at any time, added the influence of intrigue, or the invasion of a foreign enemy, the absence of men, whose peculiar interest and province it is to defend the possessions of the Crown in that country, would  
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be most dangerously felt ; it might be attended with such consequences as must involve both the kingdoms in one common ruin. Before this part of the subject is dismissed, it may be proper to bestow a few words on an argument, advanced by some advocates for a legislative union between Great-Britain and Ireland, deduced from the establishment and effects of a similar measure between England and Scotland ; in almost every essential circumstance the two cases materially differ ; England and Scotland were kingdoms within the same island, consequently an uninterrupted intercourse was preserved between the different parts of it, and the comparative evils of Irish and Scotch absentee drains bear a much greater proportion, than as two to one ; the communication also between the electors and the elected has been constantly maintained, and the influence of the latter over the constituent body, has rather encreased than diminished.

The parliamentary representation in Scotland, at the time of the Union, from original defects in its constitution, and from the reduced state of its legislative importance, could not advance claims to a large share in the new legislature, which was to govern both ; on the contrary, Ireland must, at the lowest calculation, appear equitably entitled to a very considerable proportion of the numbers, which shall constitute the general body of representatives. There were no Bishops in Scotland, but the Irish church has the well-founded demand of her legislative proportion, whatever changes the constitution may undergo ; these, and some other differences that might be enumerated, were it necessary, will serve to prove that the two cases are by no means parrallel ; there  
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is one consideration, however, not in general attended to, that alone is sufficient to establish the strongest distinction between the two instances. Scotland, at the time of the Union, and for many years after, held her people in a state of feudal subordination; it was therefore only necessary to gain the assent of the Chiefs, in order to insure that of their vassals; notwithstanding which, that kingdom was thrown into a dangerous ferment by the measure; but, in Ireland, no such clanship exists, and an acquiescence, under a great and decisive public revolution, cannot be bargained for and passed away by any set of men whatever. It appeared necessary to expatiate somewhat more largely on the policy and natural consequences of a legislative union, as a measure for the future indissoluble connection of Great-Britain and Ireland, than to the majority of both kingdoms may seem expedient, because, until the minds of men can be impressed with the utter impracticability of carrying such a scheme into execution, without a risque of the greatest danger, as well as inconvenience to each nation, the speculation on which it is founded may continue to oppose itself to any other mode of establishing a future concord between these kingdoms, and therefore, prove an impediment to the acquisition of that, which all wise men earnestly desire to see accomplished.

In establishing a foederal compact between two nations, wholly independent on each other, and previously unconnected, other than by maxims of general policy, regard is paid solely to mutual convenience and reciprocal profit; but, between two countries circumstanced with respect to each other, as Great-Britain and Ireland are, considerations of another nature blend themselves with the  
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necessary arrangement of their separate claims, and their respective privileges. So far as the liberties of the one may be affected, by the superiority in wealth and power of the other, it behoves the inferior, in the first instance, to guard scrupulously against the effects of any terms in the agreement, which may serve hereafter, either speculatively or practically, to trench upon any of the fundamental principles, which secure the free exercise of its legislative powers. Hence constitution is the primary object of Ireland, in every negotiation entered into with Great-Britain. Whatever may, even by future inference, tend to impair this, it is reasonable that she should immediately reject, because, if once admitted, it can never afterwards be resumed, and no man can say what occasions may present themselves, in the course of time, that shall tempt the stronger to oppress the weaker as heretofore, and weaken that security of freedom, which Ireland now possesses, and which is the solid foundation and main support of any durable establishment of concord, between the two countries. With respect to an arrangement merely commercial, between Great-Britain and Ireland, mutual allowances and reciprocal concessions must form the ground-work on which it can be raised, with any great public effect, either in point of union or of general improvement. Here too it appears of a very different nature from any treaty entered into by two unconnected states, where the parties are justified in attempting, by all the arts of negotiating craft, to secure for themselves the best bargain they can strike, under the different circumstances of each. On the contrary, in this case, a bad bargain for either must be a wretched one for both, and that

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sider which succeeds in over-reaching the other, will, in the end, experience the miserable effects of such contracted views and mistaken policy, by the total defeat of every purpose that could induce such a settlement, whether as to commerce or finance. Whoever maturely reflects on the circumstances of the two countries, and the posture of the empire at large, must perceive that their mutual interest ought firmly to bind them together, in one commonwealth, and that not merely the profits of their trade, nor the convenience of revenue, but their strength, their safety and existence, are ultimately concerned in the policy which they shall adopt upon this critical occasion.

But, as a wise and generous emulation is perhaps more necessary to these countries at present, than to any other that ever stood in need of each other's assistance, so the difficulty of impressing sentiments, which shall produce it, is as great as can occur in the political history of mankind. They are both nations of merchants and manufacturers; a people tenacious of their separate interests, and extremely averse to any measure that may, by remote possibility, seem to injure them. To divest themselves of their natural partialities, and of the prejudices that result from them, requires an effort which nothing but a conviction of the indispensable necessity of the sacrifice to the general welfare can ever support. If once the inhabitants of those adjoining kingdoms could be persuaded, that they constitute, as in fact they do, but one people, separated, it is true, by a small branch of the sea, yet linked together by the same laws, government, manners, and liberties, then they would view their public interests in the true light; they would consider the wealth and prosperity of the one, as the real,

real, solid, and substantial property of the other, and they would reject those mean and selfish ideas, that originate in the monopolizing spirit of trade, and cherish that generous policy, which would be abundantly recompensed by the extension of industry and improvement over all the parts of a fertile and productive country. These sentiments, the more they are canvassed, the more strongly will they demonstrate the beneficial effects naturally springing from them, and, as they are founded on principles of universal benevolence, as well as of the most extensive advantage to the community, it may be reasonably presumed that a due attention to their consequences will gradually obtain its proper influence over an enlightened people.

If Great-Britain and Ireland are considered as one extended country, then the simple, natural, and obvious policy to be adopted with respect to such a country, is so to regulate its trade and manufactures, as to produce from every part of it the most that its soil or situation is capable of affording. This can only be accomplished by a reciprocal interchange of commodities, which are either the natural growth of the several districts, or the artificial production of industry, brought nearly to perfection there: any thing that tends to restrain this freedom of exchange so far as it operates, counteracts the design of promoting the general cultivation of local advantages. If every yard of cloth manufactured in Yorkshire should be taxed a shilling as soon as it entered Lancashire, it would produce a double effect, prejudicial to both counties; it would diminish, in some degree, the demand for cloth in Lancashire, and therefore narrow the Yorkshire market, and, so far as the remaining consumption of cloth in Lancashire became necessary to

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subsistence, it would lay a charge upon every work carried on in that county ; it might be advanced, in vindication of this measure, that, in proportion as the people of Lancashire found themselves affected by this charge, they would be forced to introduce a manufacture of cloth among themselves, and, by degrees, be enabled to furnish cloth for their own consumption. There is very little doubt that the tax would, in time, produce this effect, but it would be a consequence very injurious to that county. The sale of the home manufacture, after it should be established, would be regulated by the price of the Yorkshire goods ; and, although the people of Lancashire would not continue to pay the whole amount of the tax, yet they would still pay considerably more than if no such tax had been imposed ; but this is not all ; a consequence of greater importance would result from the introduction of a new fabric, so managed, into that county ; it would divert a portion of the capital now employed on a branch of business, that, it is plain, the county is better fitted to carry on than the woollen, and so far impair the interest of the more productive manufacture. Supposing that Great-Britain and Ireland ought to be looked on as one country, whatever appears preposterous and absurd in the instance adduced, will prove equally so, when applied to them ; and, on a close, impartial examination of the subject, there is but one reason that seems to discriminate between a proper commercial arrangement, relative to the two countries, and to any two counties within the same island. It is the effect that would be produced by so great and sudden a change upon the public revenues of each country. The deficiencies necessarily occasioned by it for a time, must be greater than the circumstances of either

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could afford, and the shock might prove in the highest degree perilous to their credit and finance. So great are held to be the advantages in a commercial country of purchasing all goods at the cheapest rate, from whatever quarter, that many persons of high rank in mercantile knowledge have pleaded strongly for lowering the duties on foreign produce; and one man of great experience, so long ago as the beginning of this century, ventured to recommend the making all our ports free, and raising taxes on internal excise, after the example of Holland. But, whatever doubts may be conceived of the propriety of such a measure, with respect to foreign states, there can few be entertained upon the benefits which must accrue to the community at large, as consisting of the inhabitants of Great-Britain and Ireland, by adopting it at home. It is true the manufacturers of both nations are ever prone to raise an alarm, upon the prospect of a possible competition in the sale of their several fabrics; but interested apprehensions of this kind ought not to impede a great and comprehensive system, in the establishment of which, almost every individual but themselves is materially concerned; it is upon the dread of being underfold, that they rest their objections. What is this, in reality, but the fear of losing a monopoly, that, so far as it operates, lays a tax upon every consumer in the society for the support of a work, that can be executed more reasonably in some other part of the country? Why should an Englishman be denied the liberty of purchasing Irish linen, at a penny or two pence a yard cheaper than he can procure of his own country manufacture? Or, why should a man in Ireland be precluded from his choice of the various woollen fabrics, that Great-Britain furnishes,

nishes, and be forced to take a species of cloth, that neither suits his fancy, nor his wear, because it is worked on that side of the water which he inhabits? We complain every day of restraints that affect our liberty of action, whilst those commercial restraints, which not only affect our liberty of action, but our purse, pass wholly unobserved or disregarded.—Heretofore Ireland was so circumstanced, that it became absolutely necessary to favour the monopoly of her manufacturers, because the home market was almost the only one that furnished employment to them. But every branch of foreign, as well as domestic trade, being now laid open to that country, the arguments made use of, and the former exhortations of Irish patriots, to induce an exclusive preference to the goods worked there, do not apply, or are calculated to encourage a monopoly, as prejudicial to the true interests of an extended traffic, as it was formerly beneficial to a limited one. It is not upon maxims of general policy alone that the advantages of a common interchange of commodities, unfettered by restrictions, may be evinced. The particular state of the commercial interests of both Great-Britain and Ireland, when duly weighed, will be found to offer strong inducements to adopt such a system. Great-Britain possesses capital and shipping; she is also at present the chief vender of goods in Europe, at the general market. But other countries, where labour is cheaper, and the conveniencies of life are not so highly taxed, are advancing with rapid strides to a rivalry with her; in order to counteract this injurious competition, it will be necessary for her to search, in her own dominions, for the spot where manufactures, that require the greatest strength of coarse labour, may be conducted upon an equality,

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in point of the expence of workmanship, with those countries whose competition she has the greatest reason to dread. That spot is Ireland; but, without assistance from the capital and shipping of Great-Britain, Ireland cannot make any considerable progress for a length of time, in the establishment of manufactures. If she can receive this assistance, through the advantage of a constant market at her door, for all the different species of goods she is most capable of producing, she will naturally turn to such fabrics as will least interfere with British goods in the general market, because she will derive more immediate profit from selling to English merchants the kind of goods which they cannot procure upon the same terms at home, than from sending out cargoes directly to the market, where the risque and delay would prove greater, than her slender means could afford to support. The experience of past times exhibits an abundant proof of this, and also an example of the benefits to be expected from the operation of a free exchange between the two countries. When Great-Britain, immediately after the revolution, in return for the woollen, gave Ireland the linen manufacture, she wisely foresaw, that Ireland was, on one hand, unable to conduct it into the foreign markets, without which ability the manufacture could never encrease to a respectable growth; and, on the other, that, without some exertion on her own part, in favour of the new establishment, the profits arising from a supply of those markets, as well as from the carrying trade, might be thrown into other hands: she therefore gave a considerable bounty on the sale of Irish linens in Great-Britain, and, by that means, secured to herself all that fair proportion of benefit, which the manufacture yielded

yielded upon exportation, and which the then situation of Ireland prevented her enjoying, and she thereby afforded such a continual encouragement to the fabric, as raised it to become the principal support of Irish industry, down to the present day. Ireland, tho' possessed of this manufacture, for near a century, and exporting every year to a very considerable amount, has not hitherto availed herself of the liberty of trading with it to any part of the world, which she has always enjoyed, but has constantly thrown into the hands of the dealers in Great-Britain almost the whole of the exports in this article;—of upwards of twenty millions of yards, annually sent out of Ireland, little more than half a million has been carried into all the other markets of the world; a plain proof that she has not been in a condition to export directly, on her own account, even the produce of a manufacture perfectly established, and that she feels the great advantages to a country in her situation of ready money and a quick return. These two profits, upon the foreign sale, and upon the carrying trade of all goods which can be produced in Ireland at a cheaper rate than at home, ought equitably to content Great-Britain, and those she will enjoy for many years, that is, until the encreasing capital of Ireland shall become sufficient to enable the merchants and manufacturers there to prefer a direct trade, with a greater profit and a slow return, to a circuitous one with a smaller profit, and an immediate return; or, until, in process of time, the manufactures of Ireland shall become so well established at home, and so well known abroad, as to induce foreign merchants to send over orders to be executed there, on their own proper account, in the same manner as they now direct them to England.

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Let Great-Britain reflect but for a moment, on what principle she founded, and at a large expence maintained her colonies in America and in the West-Indies, and apply that principle to Ireland, and she will discover sufficient motives to induce the establishment of this doctrine. The advantages proposed in the system of colonization were a supply of the provinces with the manufactures of the mother country, an enlargement of power and strength, by the effects of the carrying trade, secured through the act of navigation, and an encrease of the number of inhabitants, in the general population of the empire. These advantages were, no doubt, of the utmost importance, and under the influence of a liberal policy, would have continued to flow until the present time; but unhappily, the ancient mercantile spirit of Europe interposed, and either for the most part destroyed them, as in the case of America, or burdened them with such an encrease of price on the produce of the West-India islands, as very much contributed to impair the benefits expected from them. The system of monopoly produced in this instance, what it will ever experience, a slow and silent counteraction of the exclusive advantages it aims at establishing. Without expence, without danger of an American revolution, and above all, without the certain, though gradual destructive effects of the monopolizing system, every one of these beneficial consequences would result from the proper cultivation of Ireland. Whilst Great-Britain continues to work her manufactures better and cheaper than other countries, she must enjoy almost an exclusive preference on the sale of them in Ireland. The produce of that country, either materials or workmanship, for the reasons before stated,

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will naturally seek a foreign market through the medium of her capital and her correspondence, whilst the salutary effects of an encreased population, that grand desideratum of all wise states, would be experienced in a proportion almost infinite, within a country separated by a slender channel from her, over that removed beyond the Atlantic ocean.

When the present commercial circumstances of Ireland come, on the other hand, to be weighed, an equal, if not a superior advantage will be found to result to her, from an unrestrained intercourse with Great-Britain. The two great objects which engage her interest, after the improvement of her constitution, are to avail herself as much as possible of the goodness of her ports, and their convenient situation for trade, and to cultivate the natural advantages of an excellent soil, by an intelligent application to agriculture, and by the introduction of manufactures, which shall gradually supply the materials for this trade. The first of these will be best attained by inviting the merchants of Great Britain into the ports, either to land their cargoes, to re-export them, or to vend a part of them where they shall come in, and send away the rest to a fitter market; but this cannot be effected, without such a temptation as the last of these regulations communicates, because a merchant will never be induced, merely by the goodness or convenience of a port, to touch there, unless through necessity, when he knows that part of his cargo may be collected, with considerable profit, to suit the market of the country, where that port is situated; he will then be naturally led to consider how far the position of the harbour, with respect to his trade, may, together with his advantage of sending goods there for sale,

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be turned to the best account; he will also have another temptation to resort to such port, both in his trade of export and import; he may there immediately replace that part of his cargo which he ships for the Irish market, with such produce of the country, whether materials or manufactures, as he can procure upon better terms than he could at home, and thus he will avail himself, with mutual benefit to both countries, of the effects of that system, which proposes to cultivate the local advantages of each. It may, and perhaps will be urged in Ireland, that such encouragement will tend to impede the growth of Irish shipping; to this it is answered, that Ireland, not being a country existing by itself, and consequently not in any wise concerned in the maintenance and encrease of a marine, for the purposes of war, it is her interest to employ such vessels as she can procure at the cheapest rate, provided it can be done without prejudice to the naval strength of the empire; her circumstances, at present, or, in all likelihood, for many years to come, could not furnish shipping for more than a very small proportion of her trade; and a navigation act, framed against English, as that of Great-Britain formerly against Dutch freightage, though it would hold out the most effectual encouragement to the building of Irish ships, would be attended with the total ruin of her commerce; but, exclusive of this consideration, it must be observed, in opposition to all arguments of the same stamp that this bears, that there can be very little doubt, as soon as the circumstances of the country shall admit of it, a proper share of the great commercial fund will be turned to the trade of building ships, and that until those circumstances shall, with ease, afford such an employment of the

mercantile capital, it would be extremely unwise to force it into that channel.—Besides the general advantages, which Ireland would derive to her ports, from a liberty granted to British merchants of vending part of their cargoes there, peculiar benefits would arise to Irish merchants, from a mutual privilege of sending goods to each country. When a merchant imports into Ireland a cargo of goods from the West-Indies, or from any other part of the world, he cannot always dispose of the whole of it in his own country; various causes, well known, may conspire to leave a surplus on his hands; if a market is open for this residue, though at a price inferior to that which the first sale brought, it relieves him from a burden of dead stock, which, in proportion as his capital is, or is not, well able to bear the loss resulting from the accumulation of it, is more or less injurious to him. The benefits of such a market would, no doubt, be reciprocal to Great-Britain and Ireland, but the comparative abilities of each to support the inconvenience and detriment arising from the want of it, being almost infinitely on the side of the former, it must become peculiarly the interest of the latter to establish it. The principal support of all commerce, at least with much the most productive emolument to the country, is founded in a spirited cultivation of the land, and in the introduction of those fabrics which are best suited to the climate, the soil, and other local circumstances: With respect to the first, Ireland, although within a few years much improved, is yet far removed from the perfection of which she is capable, and, with respect to the latter, she is, except as to her linens, almost in the very state of infancy; that portion of her wealth which can be appropriated to manufacturing purposes, is both

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scanty and precarious: It has been on a sudden collected from employments, to which, before the restrictions on trade were removed, it had been dedicated, and upon any great misfortune, it may probably be directed to them again; a country in this state, and desirous to promote the interests of agriculture and manufactures, should, it would seem, regard two general maxims of policy, as most essentially conducive to this end; one is, by no means to establish any regulations which may tend to throw a part of this small capital into particular employments, to which it would not of itself naturally apply; and the other, to adopt whatever arrangement may best promise to bring the goods as cheaply as possible to market. When the choice of all the different fabrics is indiscriminately offered to them who are disposed to embark in them. Private interest, which is combined with a knowledge of the work, and of the particular encouragement held out by local circumstances, will naturally point to the selection of that which probably would turn to the best account; but when, from whatever cause, they are either forced or induced to enter upon a manufacture, that otherwise would not engage their attention, the result must be a workmanship more incomplete and unprofitable, than that they would of themselves have chosen, and consequently a loss to the community of the difference in produce between the two; which loss must some how or other, be compensated by the public, otherwise the manufacture could not exist; and which loss is, for so much, a deduction from the aggregate capital of the nation. But, besides this positive loss, there is likewise an incidental one, consisting of the profit that would accrue from the employment to which their industry would have

been directed, if no such inducement or force had been interposed; and this is a matter of serious moment in a country, where the prospects of improvement in manufactures must, in a great measure, arise from an increase of the capital employed in them. Of all the methods by which the free choice of manufactures to be introduced into a country may be controuled, there is none so hurtful to that country as high duties and prohibitions, whereby an extraordinary profit is artificially created, for the maintenance of such as may be deemed congenial to the industry of the people, or to the local advantages of the soil. Bounties and high internal rewards will contribute, and sometimes very prejudicially, to the same effect; but with this remarkable difference, that they, in general, are calculated to promote an extension of the manufactures to which they are applied, whereas high duties, or prohibitions, operate as an encouragement to the same manufactures only in proportion as they are thereby limited, and consequently as the sale of them is more or less monopolized. The consequences of high duties, thus operating, are not however confined to the home market: if ever, in spite of them, the manufactures of a country should be enabled to seek a foreign one, they would then experience a considerable disadvantage in their export; the freightage would be exorbitantly enhanced; vessels, that are precluded by such duties from bringing goods into the ports, must be paid a very advanced price for the conveyance of all commodities out of them; so that, in reality, this system would impose a tax upon export, without any benefit to the carrier, or any revenue to the state, but with a very great loss to the shipper. Great-Britain, by a sufficiency of shipping, through the influence of the Act of Navigation, is not affected,

affected, in this instance, as Ireland would be. If, therefore, a controul on the choice of manufactures, in a nation just commencing their application to workmanship, be deemed prejudicial to their general interests, certainly that produced by the operation of high duties or prohibitions on certain fabrics, must be more so than any other. It is worth while to consider still farther the effects of this policy, which seems to be a favourite measure with the manufacturers of Ireland, for the advancement of their works. The chief, if not the only tendency of high duties, is to prevent, as much as possible, the importation of the goods charged with them; and it is supposed, that thereby, through necessity, the inhabitants of the country where they obtain, will purchase in their stead so much of their goods, fabricated at home, as will amount to the sum of the imports that would otherwise take place. From this forced purchase will arise an encouragement to manufactures, which, without such an extraordinary assistance, could never, perhaps, be properly conducted. In order to judge of this scheme, it is necessary to examine, whether it will produce the effect proposed, with a real utility to the object it means to serve; whether that object be such as, in prudence, ought to be pursued; and whether, supposing both these could be demonstrated, it would not be attended with such inconveniencies to the general welfare, as are sufficient to counterbalance the intended benefit. There can be very little doubt, that a lessening the number of sellers in the market, whilst that of the buyers remains the same, will increase the price of the goods to be disposed of. In proportion as this is raised, will the encouragement to their production increase; but this in-

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crease will naturally diminish the consumption by the great body of the people ; the aggregate sum to be expended in the purchase of necessaries or of luxuries, in a country, must be nearly the same, within a limited time ; if, therefore, the price of these be enhanced, the consequence must be, that the same quantity of money will purchase a smaller quantity of goods, and that less of them will be bought, than if the price was more reasonable. In proportion, then, as the sale of goods is diminished by the encrease of price, the advantage and encouragement to manufactures is abated ; and, on this account, the operation of high duties may be said to counteract, in some degree, the very design for which they were intended. But it will be proper here to enquire, who are to pay this advanced price, on the goods manufactured ; the common people, who cultivate the ground by manual labour, are neither able nor inclined to purchase any of the finer species of goods ; most of the kinds they use have been, and necessarily must be, homespun, or furnished from coarse manufactures, already sufficiently established for their demand. The higher ranks are regulated in their wear by the authority of fashion, and this is most frequently exercised, in decriing what may be easily procured, and in prizing what must be obtained with cost and difficulty. The experience of modern times abundantly proves, that, as this difficulty encreases, the rage for overcoming it gathers strength, and that high duties only augment such a desire, and the expence of the risque, incurred by gratifying it, among the superior classes. The general consumption of the articles manufactured, in consequence of this encouragement, will be among the middle ranks, of whom the manufacturers would constitute by much the greater



greater part ; they can neither apply themselves to the home spinning of the necessary articles, as the common people do, nor afford the extraordinary price which the danger of smuggling or the duties impose. Whatever is bought at this advanced rate and made use of by one manufacturer, is, according to the amount of this rate, a tax paid by him to another, and he, in his turn, exacts from his fellow workman, a like imposition ; the circulation of profit, thus reciprocally distributed among the trade, cannot, in any useful degree, augment the manufacturing capital, but the expences of living are thereby considerably encreased ; so far as the charges of living are thus encreased, the wages of the workman must be raised, and the profit on the fabric must be proportionably advanced ; but every advance of price on goods, operates formidably against the interests of all manufactures newly established in a country where the capital is small, and where the only chance of meeting rivals in a foreign market, upon advantageous terms, must arise from the ability of opposing their long credits and extensive assortments, with a decisive cheapness of production. In Great-Britain, all the several kinds of manufactures, at present in demand, have been long scattered over the face of the country, and every where supported by an abundant capital. A monopoly in the home market cannot be there so prejudicially felt, where an internal competition is created by these circumstances, as it would be in Ireland, where, at the commencement of manufactures, they must be necessarily few in number, and maintained by a scanty provision : yet, even in Great-Britain, many opinions of much weight are found to reprobate this monopoly, as injurious to the real and substantial

substantial interests of trade; and the tariff of duties, lately established between this country and France, demonstrates that these opinions have obtained a decisive influence upon the general policy of the state. It is not, by the advanced price of wearables, or of what is necessary to living, that manufactures would be affected by increased duties or prohibitions: these would extend their influence to the very fabrics themselves in Ireland; a system of this kind could not, in justice, be partially instituted; every manufacture has an equal claim on this species of public assistance; those that are employed in supplying machines, or materials for constructing them, would, in all probability, be comprehended within the encouragement. It is hardly necessary to add, that the effects of unskilfulness, or of the want of ingenuity, which must be experienced in those branches for some time after their commencement, would run through every department of workmanship, and it is difficult to imagine a consequence more essentially injurious to the feeble beginnings of national improvement in manufactures.—The next question for consideration is, whether the object sought for by high duties or prohibitions, supposing it attainable, ought in general policy, to be pursued. Upon this head, we should take into view the great prospects of trade, as it is at present circumstanced in Ireland, in order to discover what relation the particular interests of manufactures bear to the whole, and how far it may be wise to cultivate them, *rebus sic stantibus*, by the interposition of such compulsive measures. It is not easy to decide, with any certain degree of precision, upon this; so many and so various are the constituent parts of the great aggregate of commerce,

merce, even in a country limited in its powers as Ireland, that, without an opportunity of consulting all the documents, which can be furnished upon each particular subject of trade, it would be equally absurd and precipitate to hazard a judgment, that must be, of necessity, crude and unsupported; it may therefore suffice, in this place, to add one remark, that, when the difficulty of determining properly in an abstruse point of this kind, is so great, and the uncertainty of advantage from the experiment may prove much greater, the risque of adopting a decisive scheme of universal operation, must appear extremely formidable.—But, although upon a mature and well-informed deliberation, it should be judged that high duties or prohibitions would prove fully competent to the proper encouragement of an extended manufacture, and that in general commercial policy, such means of promoting it would not be followed by any detrimental consequences to the trade of the country at large, still there remains a subject of great importance that ought to be fully considered, before a resolution in favour of them should be entered into. It is, whether adopting them might not be attended with such inconveniencies to the general welfare, as are sufficient to counterbalance the intended benefit.—In the first place, high duties or prohibitions must, *pro tempore*, cut off one source of revenue to the state, and until they produced the capacity of replacing this revenue, by the general improvement of the country, through the influence of manufactures, the deficiency must be supplied by an additional tax upon every member of the community, from the man who holds the plough to the first peer of the realm. All taxes raised by domestic imposts, ultimately fall upon the land; the interests of agriculture

culture would therefore, mean while, suffer a most grievous, and we may add, a most unjust disadvantage. Deprived, as the landholders are, for the public safety, of the common privilege of exporting the produce of their industry, it would be doubly oppressive to load them with taxes, that the other members of the labouring commonwealth may enjoy a monopoly over them. This, however, is not the only, nor perhaps the greatest injury, that agriculture would sustain. If high duties or prohibitions shall operate so decisively to the encouragement of manufactures, it must be by raising the profit on them much beyond that derived from other objects of industry. The rate of manufacturing gains will then so far exceed what may be expected from agriculture, that a part of the capital employed on it would probably be withdrawn, or that share of the general fund, which would otherwise be directed to it, would be diverted to the more advantageous and gainful occupations. In Ireland this preference would produce more detrimental consequences than possibly in any other country of Europe; the soil being, for the most part, rich and luxuriant, and at the same time little removed from its natural state, all attention bestowed, or expence laid out, on the improvement of it, would yield an extraordinary return. In proportion, therefore, as the expenditure of the national stock may be prevented from applying to, or diverted from, this object, will be the general result of loss to the community. Every improvement in land production will augment the sum of provisions, and lower their price; and, on the contrary, a neglect of this improvement will encrease the rate of them, and deprive Ireland of the most considerable advantage she now possesses, in the cheapness of the necessities



series of life.—Upon all these accounts, it seems evidently the interest of a country, situated as Ireland is, to avoid any measure which might interrupt the natural progress of improvement in that direction which the advantage of individuals shall point out to their several abilities, their knowledge, or inclinations, and that the principal and most substantial object which she should propose to herself is, to gain, if possible, a ready market for the immediate sale of her surplus produce, and this, no doubt, can be best attained by such a commercial arrangement between Great Britain and her as shall correspond with the reciprocal advantage of both.—If, upon this general reasoning, it appears, that each country will derive an important benefit from a mutual interchange of commodities, and that the prosperity of the empire at large essentially depends upon a rational scheme of effecting this, with a promise of stability to the measure, and of an intercourse of affection between the parties, it remains to consider, how such a system as may best promote this great end can, with the most reasonable prospect of success, be established. Considering the almost infinite variety of separate interests that appear on both sides to demand attention, when each individual concern is taken into survey, it will be found, at all times, impossible so to regulate the duties, payable on imports into each country, as to reconcile them with that strictness of equity which every specific manufacture, or article of commerce, may judge it reasonable to expect; nor would it, in reality, be consistent with the sound policy of the scheme itself, to enter into a detail of this kind.—The scheme must be universal, and, from the very nature of the end proposed, it must also be permanent. From the first of these properties;

it follows, that what relates to all ought not to be warped to the peculiar and distinct circumstances of a few, and that what may be lost by one branch of trade will be compensated to another.—In the successive fluctuations of commerce, distinct and separate duties, imposed on particular branches, to suit their respective interests at the present time, may, and probably will, be found wholly incompatible with the trade, even in those branches themselves hereafter, and much more so with that of others, which shall spring up and make a revision and alteration of such duties indispensable. Permanency, therefore, under regulations formed to answer a temporary and individual convenience, cannot be expected, and the necessity of a future change in any part, would hazard such a breach of the general system as must shake the whole building to the very foundation. A certain stated and general ratio, whereon to ground the duties applicable to the future trade between the two countries, is therefore a main support of such a commercial arrangement as can produce the effects proposed. In forming this, the strictest regard should be paid to the first principle of the design; namely, that of deriving to the inhabitants of both countries, the advantages which the circumstances of soil, situation, and other local incidents can best supply from the general industry. When this principle is applied to the ratio of duty, it will be necessary, again, to take into consideration the peculiar state of each country.—Great-Britain possesses capital; Ireland wants it: the merchants and manufacturers of that country which is deficient in capital, cannot meet those who possess it upon equal terms, in the market of either, unless the capacity of procuring such an addition to the mercantile and manufacturing stock, as may be necessary

fary to the proper conduct of their business, can, by some means or other, be communicated to them. It will therefore be proper to discover, how, in the present circumstances of Ireland, this increase of capital, to be employed in the business of commerce, is to be procured. The parliament of that country have devised a scheme of effecting this, which appears to be the only safe and practicable one, for deriving to trade and manufactures, by gentle and gradual means, that portion of the aggregate wealth of the country, which, being amassed by individuals, either remains unemployed, or is directed to the relief of private necessities, by loan. This scheme is formed by holding out an encouragement to those who are disposed to embark, with others, a part of their money in trade, but who might be deterred from doing so, by the apprehensions of thereby subjecting the rest of their property to the claims of creditors upon the general firm of the partnership, and to the operation of the bankrupt laws. In consequence of it, such persons as are inclined to speculate with a part of their money in any branch of trade or manufactures, are relieved from these apprehensions, by exempting all their property from the claims of mercantile creditors, or the operation of those laws, save only that part which is appropriated to the employments of trade, and which must be publicly registered at an office when they first enter into the partnership.—How far this has hitherto operated in that country, towards the end proposed, cannot here be ascertained; but it seems reasonable to suppose, that it will produce considerable effects; and, no doubt, it has wisely provided the means of extending trade and manufactures there, without incurring the objection of carrying them on, by false capitals, which must be extremely dangerous.

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No man, however, under this scheme, or indeed any other, will add his money to the aggregate fund of commerce, unless he can derive from thence, at least, what by advancing it upon loans he may be assured of, without risque, that is, in Ireland, six per cent. This rate, therefore, appears to be the smallest that can be struck, as that of duty, upon a presumption of affording Ireland the possibility of adding to her trading capital, or of putting the two nations upon a par in the market, and being one that results from a general difference of circumstance between the parties, and not from a partial regard to any branch of commerce, it may be judged on these accounts, the most suitable to the purposes of an universal and equitable agreement, on this head. It is true an advantage would exist against Ireland, where a rate of six per cent. upon money obtains, when she shall send her goods into Great-Britain, where only that of five per cent. is established; but, besides that, for many years, it is highly probable that Ireland, in most articles of her trade, will supply the foreign exportation, and not the home consumption of Great Britain; where the internal duties of the country, added to six, or any other rate per cent. on importation, must render it extremely difficult to combat the sale of old established manufactures, on the spot. The price of provisions and of labour in Ireland, must create, for some time, an advantage on her side, though by no means such as has been represented by the fears and apprehensions of British manufacturers: those apprehensions have gone so far, as to pronounce that the home sale of their fabrics could not contend with that of Irish manufacturers, even protected by a duty of ten and an half per cent. and much ingenuity has been exercised to prove the reality of their danger, should a commercial



mercial regulation take place between the two countries, under this rate of duty. It is certainly natural enough, that those who have been for a long time in full possession of an exclusive trade, should wish to retain it, if possible, entire and undisturbed; the most distant chance of infringement is sufficient to create an universal alarm among them; and, as this chance is lessened or postponed, by raising the duty as high as possible, it becomes their interest to magnify the propable consequences of a rivalry, under a moderate duty, into the most destructive evils which their talents can display. But, whoever would judge impartially upon the subject, will look to facts, and not depend upon theories and surmises: he will then see the British manufacturer supplying the Irish market, loaded with a duty of ten and an half per cent. besides the charges of freight and commission. If, therefore, Great Britain can at present undersell her Sister Country in her own market, paying those charges of near twelve per cent. the latter, in order to be enabled to meet her at the market on her side of the water, upon dangerous terms of competition, must manufacture her goods at upwards of twenty-four per cent. cheaper than they are now wrought in Ireland, supposing the same rate of ten and a half per cent. to be payable on their importation into Great Britain. This is an event almost impossible, in a country stinted in capital, and hardly advanced beyond the first establishment of manufacture; and the fact upon which the observation is grounded, will sufficiently manifest the futility of those apprehensions, that were either really entertained, or purposely affected, by the manufacturers of Great-Britain upon a late occasion. This fact goes a step further: it proves, that under a duty of ten and a half per cent.

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established in each country, Ireland would have little chance of vending goods in Great-Britain, whilst she would enjoy the same market in Ireland that she now does; a disparity that, in the circumstances of both, must appear wholly inequitable, and palpably contradict the fundamental principle of the argument already laid down, that of deriving from each country the benefits which its local circumstances can best supply. At a duty of six per cent. Ireland must manufacture her goods upwards of thirteen per cent. cheaper than she does at present, to gain a chance of selling them in Great-Britain; and this, considering the advantages possessed by the manufactures already established there, supported by powerful capitals, must be deemed sufficient to prevent any sudden influx of goods, that could occasion a dangerous convulsion to the manufacturing interests of this country. In fact, if the trade was laid open between the two nations, and only the internal duties of each, which must ever remain, were to exist, it is by no means probable, that Ireland would, in many years, be able to push her manufactures into the home consumption of Great-Britain; at least such of them as may, in any wise, enter into competition with her great and productive fabrics.—The advantages which Ireland would derive from the low price of labour there, as relative to manufactures, would extend principally to the branches where manual operation, and not handicraft skill is required; and therefore her substantial hope of gains must proceed from embarking in those kinds, which would least interfere with British rivalry, either in the home or foreign market, where she may expect to trade through British capital. There are some fabrics,  
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almost peculiar to herself, which, on account of antient establishment, and, from thence, an acquired superiority of skill in the workmanship, she can supply; even to Great-Britain, on lower terms than they can be wrought at home; but these are few in number, and of insignificant value in the great scale of merchandize, except the immense article of linen, which it is evidently the advantage of Great-Britain to receive from her.

In a commercial arrangement between Great-Britain and Ireland, there are two other particulars, besides a rate of duty, which must be investigated; these are, what articles it may be proper to admit into each country, free of duty, and how the trade with the colonies ought to be mutually adjusted, in a permanent compact of this kind. As to the first, it would seem, that all raw materials of manufactures, and all such as have not passed beyond their first stage of workmanship, together with the necessary means, either natural or artificial, of carrying them on, should be allowed the most perfect freedom of interchange; of the first kind, are wool, hemp, flax, hides, &c. of the second, are woollen, cotton and linen yarn, &c. and of the last are coals, bark, salt, kelp, &c. It has been established as a maxim, in all countries, where manufactures are instituted, not to suffer their raw materials to be exported. This is not the place to enter into any argument upon this, as a general rule of policy; it may, or it may not, be a right one, in the extent contended for; but, if ever there could be admitted an exception, it must be in the instance before us. Should the two countries consider themselves, as engaged in the pursuit of their own separate interests, through the

whole of a commercial negotiation between them, the general maxim, if a right one, will then perfectly apply ; but, if they enter upon this treaty, with the liberal intentions, which can alone render it permanent and mutually productive, nothing can be more inapplicable ; so much so indeed, that a refusal to communicate to each other the rude produce of their respective soils, would argue, beyond all doubt, such a disposition to withhold reciprocal benefits, as must demonstrate the strongest desire of counteracting (whatever ostensible professions may urge to the contrary) the very end and purpose of the agreement. Besides, in the present situation of the parties, with respect to this point, it would be unjust as well as ungenerous. There is now a free importation from Ireland into Great-Britain, of all the raw materials she produces ; on the other hand, there is nearly a prohibition of export from Great-Britain to Ireland, of the most of her raw materials. This difference arose from the oppressive system of monopoly, which previous to the emancipation of the latter, had been erected by the former, as the rule of her government ; to take advantage of a circumstance, which is the growth of a palpable infringement on the natural equality of the two countries, and in a treaty, as between two people, intimately connected by the strongest ties, to establish an *uti possidetis* of this kind, as between two hostile nations, who had concluded a long and destructive war, is wholly inconsistent with either liberality or justice. However generosity may be deemed incompatible with sound policy, when relative to the conduct of nations, entirely separate from each other, as to mutual dependence, it ought not to be excluded from its place, in a treaty



treaty which professes to bind, as closely as possible, the affections and interests of two countries now existing merely by their connection with each other. Those virtues of liberality or justice, are hardly to be digested by the manufacturing part of a nation; one need only cast an eye over the general complexion of answer and mode of reasoning, by such of them as were examined before the Parliament of Great-Britain, on the late commercial negotiation, to judge of the policy they would adopt in carrying on a measure of this important nature. One of their objections to the scheme then under consideration, arose from their apprehensions lest the people of Ireland should be thereby encouraged to work up their own materials, and the dealers in leather went even so far upon this ground, as to prophecy destruction to their branch of business, from any regulation which could induce their neighbours to manufacture raw hides, and by this means, diminish the present immense exportation of them from Ireland into Great-Britain. It may well be questioned, whether the interested spirit, which sentiments of this nature display, so inconsistent with the principles of reciprocity, which should constitute the basis of an agreement between the two nations, is not, almost equally inconsistent with the general advantage of the country it means to serve. The very article of leather, which occasioned so much alarm to the dealers, forms so important an accessory to all the works in Great Britain, from the structure of a first rate man of war, to the smallest machine used in handicraft, that should the apprehensions of the workmen in this branch, of being underfold by Ireland, prove well-founded, yet the community

would benefit ten-fold by a reduction of the price, though attended by a total annihilation of the manufacture. Applications have been made to Parliament, by the wool-growers, for a liberty of exporting; the price of this commodity has been, for some years, so low as sufficiently to evince that a considerable surplus remained after the manufacturing demand, and therefore, that the interests of the grazing counties were so much affected, as to disable them, in a great measure, from paying their rents. Although a doubt has been entertained upon the propriety of an export of wool to other countries, there can scarce any remain with respect to Ireland.—An export to that kingdom might bring wool to a moderate and steady level, and prevent the necessity of soliciting one to those countries, which are likely to become the rivals of Great Britain in the general market, without affording any of the profits to her, which she must derive from every article sent into that market by her sister kingdom. When we come to the second class of articles, which it may be proper to admit, duty free, into each country, we shall discover the same interested spirit, on the part of Ireland, as was remarked on the former head, as actuating the manufacturers of Great Britain, proceeding from the same cause and dictated by similar motives. When the manufacturers in linen and woollen came before the House of Commons there, in support of what are called protecting duties, they insisted, with uncommon earnestness, on the necessity of imposing an heavy duty on the exportation of linen and bay yarn; that is, they were not contented with a monopoly against other countries, which they would gain by a duty on the import of manufactures from thence, unless they could establish one against their own

own brother workmen, by a duty on the export of such parts of the rudiments as they wanted to complete their fabrics. This measure would have been still more inconsistent with the general advantage of the country intended to be served by it, than the former instance in Great Britain. If there be a sufficient demand at home for a manufacture, in any stage of its progress, the advantage of selling there, rather than abroad, will fully prevent its export; but if there be not, then an external demand is necessary to supply the defect and to furnish employment in that particular line, to those people who, without it, must remain idle; to restrain this demand from abroad, would amount to no less than an annihilation of so much labour as is created by it, and the general encouragement to that particular species being thus abridged, the price of the goods would then be gradually raised beyond the rate which they would otherwise bring; so far, therefore, as this consequence might ensue, it would operate directly contrary to the interests of those who wished to promote the measure for a very different purpose; but in Ireland, where manufactures are not yet extended, and where the employment of the poor is of such immense consequence, to throw that great proportion of them, at present occupied in spinning linen and bay yarn, upon the mercy of the linen and woollen manufactures of that country, would be, to the last degree, impolitic and unjust. The manufacturing doctrine which has been held forth as an axiom in trade, that an export of fabrics, before they arrive at their last stages, is unwise to admit, is not to be supported, either from theory or practice. Admitting the first part of this maxim in its fullest extent, the consequence by no means follows.

follows. It is, on the contrary, an important object to the common industry of a people, to open a general market for the produce of that industry, whenever the workmen, in a branch of it, chuse to send into that market. A competition among the buyers, and a briskness of sale, will yield that equable rate of encouragement, which must prevent a stagnation in the market, that would prove destructive to all the manufactures depending on the purchase of those subordinate kinds, and that species of injustice which would allow a perfect liberty of export to manufactures in a certain stage, and restrain this liberty in another, would, in all such instances, bring its own punishment along with it. It seems unnecessary to enlarge upon the propriety of admitting all the natural and the artificial means of carrying on manufactures, to the most perfect freedom of interchange in any system, which professes to yield a mutual assistance from each kingdom to the other.

There is no part of any scheme to be devised for a permanent commercial agreement between the two countries so difficult to be adjusted, with a proper respect to the substantial interests of both, as a regulation of the colony trade between them.—The colonies are undoubtedly the exclusive property of Great-Britain; she enjoys a monopoly there, and consequently, a power of retaining or communicating it as she pleases; Ireland, on the other hand, enjoys a perfect liberty of commerce with the whole world, and she may confine herself to buy of British colonies, or resort to other countries, as she pleases. Fortunately, however, it appears to be the mutual interest of both, not only to trade in common to those possessions for the supply of the internal consumption in each kingdom,



dom, as at present, but to allow a reciprocal freedom of interchange to their products, when they shall arrive in Europe. If Great-Britain should refuse a proportionable share of the monopoly, it must occasion a necessity of importing or purchasing West-India commodities from other quarters. These would, in all probability, come much cheaper to market at home, than the same kinds from the colonies, and from hence would arise so strong a temptation to smuggling them from Ireland to Great Britain, as, considering the frequent opportunities at all times occurring from the situation of the two countries, no power of law or vigilance could resist. A clandestine influx of this kind would not only ruin the colonies, but the fair trader in Great-Britain, who deals in their commerce, and produce such a convulsion in the mercantile commonwealth as must formidably shake the whole foreign trade of Great-Britain. This is a consequence sufficiently understood and acknowledged to demonstrate, that the interest of Great-Britain is mutually concerned in a communication of her West-India monopoly to Ireland; and accordingly, at the period when Ireland was freed from the restraints which heretofore prohibited her external commerce, it was prudently determined to bestow on her the liberty of importing directly from the colonies into that country, upon certain terms, which she now enjoys. The trade which has arose from this liberty has, from various causes, not as yet sufficiently extended itself to promote any formidable effects of smuggling. But whenever Ireland shall acquire the means of entering largely into the commerce of the West-Indies, such a consequence may be reasonably expected, unless it be provided against, by admitting that intercourse legally and  
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openly, which will otherwise obtain in an illicit and clandestine manner. In considering how far Ireland may be advantaged by accepting this monopoly, upon the terms of confining her purchase to the goods of the British colonies, regard must be had to the circumstances that would attend her purchase of the same goods elsewhere. Though she should be admitted to buy the produce of the French, the Dutch, or any other colonies, she certainly could not expect the privilege of supplying them with European goods; her ships must go out in ballast, and it must be, for the most part, a trade of import, which would be highly injurious to her in her present state. If she preferred purchasing the same goods in Europe, when imported by the different proprietors of colonies, it is evident that she must surrender all chance of a direct communication with the West-Indies. Scarcely any diminution of price could compensate for this; and if she was drove by necessity to have recourse to it, she would hurt herself very considerably, but she would hurt Great-Britain much more. There is, besides this commercial interest, another of a much higher importance, in which both countries are mutually engaged, as to the colony trade. It is the great and substantial interest of the empire. It has been advanced, and perhaps upon reasonable grounds, that the colonies of Great-Britain communicate their principal advantages to the mother country through the growth of naval strength, which their trade abundantly promotes. They add the most perfect energy to the policy of the act of navigation, which, notwithstanding the speculative doubts of some of the modern writers upon this subject, is almost universally regarded, as the principal bulwark of the imperial power of these kingdoms. Great-Britain

is therefore at all times wisely anxious to guard against any possible infringement on the great outline of that famous institution; and Ireland, as a member of the empire, and one that on the event of a perfect agreement with her sister kingdom, would be to the full as deeply concerned in the defence and prosperity of the whole, ought to watch over it with the like scrupulous attention. If Ireland, thus standing on the same ground with Great-Britain, shall equally perceive the necessity of cultivating the principle of the act of navigation, she will, merely on this account, attach herself to the colony trade, by which that principle is most efficaciously supported; and to talk of a difference of price, or any other mercantile inconvenience, when the common safety of both lays at stake, is a waste of words, bestowed on an object wholly unworthy the attention of a great nation, when one of such infinite importance presents itself. Although this seems to be, and really is, a concern of the greatest moment to each of the parties engaged in the arrangement, yet it is extremely difficult to comprehend it within a conclusive agreement of this kind, with a reasonable degree of satisfaction to both. Great-Britain has the custody of the act in question; she also claims the right of altering and adapting its regulations, in future, to the exigencies of the empire, and she expects that Ireland will bind herself to re-enact those regulations, which she may think conducive to the reciprocal advantage of both, without alteration on her part. The good policy of this concurrence, as conducive to the welfare of the empire, has not been disputed in Ireland, but the manner of enforcing it hereafter, propounded to the parliament of that country, last session, has been violently controverted there. If

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appears, beyond contradiction, repugnant to the spirit and whole frame of the British constitution; to submit to the obligation of adopting laws to be made, in future, by another country, the terms of which laws cannot be ascertained, at the time of entering into such obligation. The very essence of all freedom, natural or political, is constituted by the use of discretion and the power of deliberation; to surrender these would be to relinquish both the form and substance of liberty; and a necessity of doing so, imposed either by external force, or internal consent, is equivalent to the exercise of any right, derived from conquest. The existence of this necessity, as arising to Ireland from the terms of the compact, is denied; and, no doubt, in theory it does not follow, from the letter of those terms: But in future practice it would in its fullest extent, and be attended also with circumstances of the most alarming nature, to the future prosperity of both countries. Ireland would certainly possess, under the compact, a power of rejecting such laws, relative to trade and navigation, as Great Britain should think proper to enact, and, so far, she appears, in theory, to retain a discretionary and a deliberative faculty; but, if she should at any time exercise it, she would, at the same time, reject not only them, but the whole code of regulations entered into for promoting a commercial intercourse between the two nations, and all the privileges that are conveyed by them, and the benefits that may hereafter proceed from them.— Every commercial advantage, supposed to flow to Ireland from the compact, encreases the necessity of submission, on her part, to this obligation. But, what must render this necessity absolutely and invincibly certain, would be a consideration of much greater



greater moment than any loss of commercial advantages whatever, would be no less than the strongest apprehensions of a breach between the two countries. Great Britain, whenever she shall make an alteration in those laws, must do so, either from a view to the general welfare of the empire, or from a desire of correcting the effects of a completion, arising from the compact, that, for the moment, she may suppose injurious to her particular interest. The means of accommodating these alterations to such a purpose, in a thousand different shapes, without violating the letter of the agreement, must occur, whenever occasion demands it. In the first case, when she supposes the welfare of the empire concerned, it cannot be doubted that she would not suffer Ireland to take shelter under the exercise of a speculative right, from the consequences of a practical infringement on the compact, in a point of such immense importance; and in the last, when she deems it necessary to adopt so decisive a measure, it can as little be doubted, that she has beforehand weighed the probable result, with a determination to enforce the letter of the agreement, on one side, whilst she feels herself so powerfully urged, by interest, to break through the spirit of it, on the other. Here then, in the only two instances that can occur, relative to a change in the Act of Navigation, it would come to Ireland under little less than a moral necessity of submitting to it, inasmuch as she must, by a refusal, yield up all the advantages she would enjoy, by a cultivation of the trade, opened to her through the compact, and, besides, incur a most tremendous hazard of affording to Great Britain, the pretence, when the means are also in her power, of compelling a strict adherence to the literal tenor of the agreement.

In proportion, therefore, as practice is superior, in energy, to speculation, so far is the necessity, here described, more powerful than one existing, merely in forms and verbal obligation, and a prospect of the consequences is fully sufficient to justify the weaker country, in hesitating to subscribe conditions, that shall lead to a contest with the stronger, or to a surrender of all privilege of judging and deciding in concerns of the utmost importance.—Whatever advantages Great Britain might propose to herself, by insisting on a measure of this kind, which would confer an effectual superiority, not very unlike what she formerly enjoyed over Ireland ; it is, by no means, certain that such a policy would be, to her, either safe or beneficial. As a commercial state, she ought not perhaps to entrust herself with it, if she be desirous of cultivating her sister kingdom. There is no instance of such a power, exercised by a mercantile commonwealth, without the most flagrant abuse. It is not probable that it would rest, in her hands, for ever dormant, and the experience of past times, relative to both these countries, demonstrates, that it cannot be called into action, without producing miserable effects.

This great obstacle, to an agreement between the two nations, may, perhaps, be properly surmounted by either of two methods: The first, by leaving the adoption of such changes of the Act of Navigation, as Great Britain may deem expedient hereafter, to the free direction of Ireland, and by this liberal policy, no such formidable hazard will be incurred, as the most wary politicians in Great Britain seem to apprehend. Should the measure of a commercial union between the two countries, by connecting the interests and affections of both, produce the effects so earnestly to be desired, no doubt

doubt can remain, that what tends to the increase of the Imperial strength, or to the general security of trade, must engage the anxious support of each. Nothing but the spirit of folly can ever influence the Irish nation, to reject any measure, proposing to attain these great ends, and which, at the same time, fairly imparts equal benefits to them, as are communicated to the people of Great Britain, and nothing but insanity can, at any time, urge the British legislature to expose an institution of such infinite importance, to the risk of an infringement, by a partial application of its advantages to their own country. The same folly, on the one hand, would not be deterred, by the black letter of an antient statute, from pursuing the phantom of independence, and on the other, all regard to consequences of the most serious nature, to the general welfare, would probably be wholly obliterated, as it has heretofore been, by the spirit of exclusion and monopoly. If, therefore, the parties shall continue to cherish the policy of a distinct and separate interest, no terms, however strong and formal, can deter them from a cultivation of it, whenever occasion shall offer; but, if they shall permit reason and the sober dictates of prudence to direct them, the very circumstance of a discretionary power, left to the free and voluntary command of each, will effectually serve to controul both, within a wise and just exercise of it. In order to judge of the scope and the efficacy of the other method, for the security of the future regulations of the Act of Navigation, it will be necessary here to observe, that, by the one proposed in Ireland, and which has been hitherto treated of, the universal commerce of the two nations, as well as that particular branch, which is concerned in the trade to the West Indies and the

the Colonies, is comprehended, within the agreement, to re-enact in Ireland, all the commercial laws, that shall hereafter be adopted in Great Britain. The same reason does not seem, justly, to demand an assent to this measure, with respect to other nations, in their communication with Ireland, as with respect to that between Ireland and the British Colonies. It does not appear, that Great Britain, treating with her sister kingdom, upon terms of equality, has any right to demand that she shall circumscribe her commerce to foreign states, within the regulations, which the British legislature shall think adviseable to enact. But, as to the trade with her own Colonies, she has the most perfect right to impose what conditions she pleases, upon a participation of it.— Whether it be prudent in one to require, or the other to accept, such as have been offered, has already been discussed. On this view of the subject, however, it would, apparently, tend very much to the satisfactory adjustment of the terms, upon which a settlement of the great point in question should rest, to separate the claim of Great Britain, in the instance of the colony trade, from that, which concerns the remainder of the world. The latter would, then, remain free to the discretion of Ireland, whilst the former would receive such modifications, from time to time, as the donor should think expedient, for regulating the mutual commerce of both nations, so far as regards the Colonies of Great Britain only. But, were this principle established, as to the Colony trade, it will be evident to all those conversant in the subject, that the same regulations would probably be found necessary, by Ireland, to all other branches of the commercial system. In this case, however,



however, a refusal, at any time, on the part of Ireland, to adopt the British alterations in the Act of Navigation, could be only regarded, as an infraction of the compact on that part merely, which relates to the Colonies, and to include within it, an infraction of all other parts of the agreement, would be, at once, impolitic and unjust. Under these circumstances, it is apparent that Ireland would labour under much less moral necessity of submitting to such future alterations, in the code of mercantile laws, as Great Britain should propose, than, if the loss of the whole system, of mutual intercourse between the two countries, was to ensue, and, so, far, the unconstitutional tendency of the requisition would be, in practice, very much abated. It then remains to be considered, whether, even by a refusal on the part of Ireland, to adopt the legal alterations of Great Britain, as to the Colony trade, she should be regarded, as having made such a breach of the compact, in this particular, as to incur a total prohibition of access to the Colonies. It has been already suggested and argued, that a prohibition of this kind must prove extremely detrimental to the commercial interests of both countries. If this be well founded, such a prohibition should never, in any case, be admitted. It will be sufficient for Great Britain, to guard, as well as possible, against the prejudicial effects, to herself, that are most likely to follow such a refusal. The most formidable of these would be, an influx of commodities, which, being imported without the future restraints of the Act of Navigation, might be poured upon her coasts, and sold at a cheaper rate than her own merchants could afford. To correct this, and to bring the Irish merchant, as nearly as may be, to a level with the British, it might be constituted  
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an essential part of the agreement, that in case Ireland should, at any time, withdraw herself from the British regulations of the Colony trade, then that particular branch of commerce, which, before, was carried on, through an unlimited intercourse between the two countries, should be restrained to certain discharging and receiving ports, within each kingdom, which should be specified at the time of entering into the agreement, in the same manner, as, at present, the tobacco trade is regulated. This measure must be regarded, as nothing more, on the part of Great Britain, than a wise and just preventative of the mischiefs, that might arise to her commerce with her own Colonies, from the admission of another nation to trade with them, upon other terms than she prescribes to herself, whilst it would lay the Colony trade from Ireland, under such a degree of embarrassment, as might serve, at the same time, to prevent any unnecessary departure from the general marine policy of the empire, or, if unfortunately, a commercial breach should occur between the two countries, it would tend to bring the venders of West India goods to a level in the British market. Should this be judged not sufficiently compulsive upon Ireland, to induce her concurrence with the future alterations in the Act of Navigation, another regulation, in the very spirit of that law, might be substituted. The import of West-India commodities from Ireland into Great Britain, might be limited to British registered ships alone, and they carrying trade of colonial produce would then, so far as relates to the mutual intercourse between the two countries, be exclusively thrown into the hands of British owners. There is a circumstance that merits observation, which certainly would much contribute, under these regulations, to preserve that good understanding between the real commercial

commercial interests of both countries, so necessary to their substantial welfare. A breach that would bring on an enforcement of such restraints, would materially injure the fair trader; the illicit dealer would alone be benefited by it, and therefore it must behove the merchants in each, as well as the ruling powers over both nations, to beware of involving themselves and their revenue in the consequences of any hasty and ill-judged policy, that would mutually and deeply affect them. If there be no commercial objection to this mode of surmounting the grand obstacle to a final adjustment of this great business, it is pretty certain there can remain no constitutional one. Ireland could not complain, with a shadow of reason, that her sister kingdom attempts to reclaim the power of legislating externally for her: Great Britain apparently, and in effect, does no more than guard, with prudence, against the evils, which she has grounds to apprehend from an inequality in the terms upon which both kingdoms may trade to her own possessions, and only pursues a little farther the same policy, which Ireland has herself adopted and carried into effect, ever since the general liberty of trade has been communicated to her, and Ireland can never labour under the necessity of an unfair compulsion, to adopt implicitly whatever the other, in the future caprices of monopoly, shall please to dictate. In fact there is little, or rather no risque, of that country's refusing her assent, to any regulations of the Colony trade which Great Britain may deem expedient, and which bears the semblance of equality and mutual advantage. The real danger is on the other side, and whoever understands the actual extent of the authority maintained by the British Administration in Ireland, and which must, at all times, be sufficiently preserved, to discharge  
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the functions of Government there, will be sensible, that a fair and reciprocal measure of this kind, must ever meet a concurrence from the legislature of that kingdom.

Let this and other subjects of commercial agreement between the two countries, be arranged as they best may, by a prudent and just accommodation, still there will remain one of considerable magnitude to be adjusted, and of a very nice complexion to be treated on. Great-Britain expects from her sister kingdom, when she shall fairly embark with her in the same vessel of state, that she shall furnish a proportionable quota to the general expence. This is, in itself, so perfectly consistent with sound and necessary policy, that were no such article to form an essential stipulation of the treaty, it cannot be presumed that Ireland would refuse to the aggrandizement, or the safety of the empire, whatever her means could at any time afford. In fact she has never done so, even when an increase of power in the principal, communicated neither wealth nor greatness to the inferior state. The aids thus given from time to time, in whatever shape they may have been yielded, must be regarded heretofore as the contributions of a province to her mother country; and although they did not in many instances, apply immediately to the great and imperial purposes of the state, yet by providing for subordinate objects of government, they relieved it from so much of the expence as was incident to these services. In the present relative situation of the two countries, a direct grant of revenue from the kingdom of Ireland to that of Great-Britain, may be considered as a subject of peculiar delicacy. In political theory, such a yearly contribution, forming a *sine*  
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*quâ non* of any agreement between the kingdoms, appears to strike at the future equality of both, that ought to be preserved, and however this may be defended from the objection by representing it as a fair price, advanced from year to year for protection to the trade of the contributing state, yet so far as by the terms of the compact this grant is rendered necessary and unavoidable, it contradicts the fundamental principles of the British Constitution, and brings it almost within the characteristic properties of a tribute. That such a necessity would really and substantially ensue, under the circumstances of the part of a late negotiation which related to this branch of the subject, appears uncontrovertible, if the argument to demonstrate the practical existence of it, in the case of a future change in the Act of Navigation, be well founded. There is one consideration that in the present instance even more strongly enforces this argument. The contribution, being known and established, cannot hereafter be objected to on the part of Ireland, as either a novel imposition, unthought of at the time of entering into the general agreement, or as a regulation which may sacrifice the commercial interests of one country to the mercantile avarice of the other.—Here both the letter and spirit of the compact unite in demanding a necessary adherence to that article, which may be termed a transfer of the consideration money upon which the whole is grounded. It is certainly dangerous to subject the discretionary power of the legislature to any impulse from external authority, but much more particularly so in what concerns the grant of money: even forms, of apparently the most trivial nature, are regarded by the British constitution as of the utmost consequence,

quence, when relative to this most important of its functions ; because it is impossible to foresee how far, and how irretrievably, a departure from established maxims may lead towards the overthrow of that principle, upon which the very being of our liberty depends. But, whether this speculative and possible evil may be deemed sufficiently formidable to deter the Irish Parliament from entering upon a measure that may produce it, the very frame of the proposition offered on this head by Great-Britain, contained such a practical scheme of carrying this measure into execution, as, duly weighed, must be found of much more serious importance. There cannot a doubt be entertained, by any considering person, of the fair, candid, and liberal intentions of the British ruling powers, either legislative or ministerial, with respect to the present or the future liberties of Ireland, in the formation of the terms upon which it has been proposed to unite the two nations ; but it is somewhat to be apprehended, that the circumstances of Ireland, with respect to her revenue, and the principal differences which strongly discriminate it from that of Great-Britain, have not been understood, or have been overlooked upon that occasion. The revenue of Ireland, as it is now collected, is formed of two separate branches ; one is composed of what is called hereditary, the other of such aids as have from time to time, been voted by the Parliament of that kingdom. The former is perpetual in its duration ; the latter temporary, and depending on the continual discretion of the legislature. The hereditary revenue, consisting of duties on customs, excise, hearth-money, &c. was granted to the crown, in perpetuity, in the reign of Charles the Second,

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and at the same time were enacted certain regulations for collecting them; but these duties, in process of time, having become insufficient for the maintenance of the establishments, it became necessary for succeeding monarchs to resort to Parliament, at different periods, for additional grants, which were made, but not in perpetuity, as the former. Various modes of evading the duties being devised, which were neither foreseen nor provided against at the time of granting the hereditary revenue, new regulations were also necessary to accompany the new grants, in order to render them suitably productive. But the new duties being, for the most part, only an increase of tax upon the articles already subject to the hereditary duties, consequently all regulations, directed to the better and more profitable collection of the temporary, contributed to the better and more profitable collection of the perpetual duties. A very considerable proportion, therefore, of the hereditary revenue, at this day, arises from the operation of these regulating statutes, which are, from time to time, renewed and extended, and, for so much, it depends entirely on the discretion of Parliament: this dependence has been esteemed the great bulwark of the constitution of Ireland. It is certainly possible, that, by a prudent and economical management of the hereditary revenue in that country, under the regulations now in force for the collection of it, by paring down the civil and military establishments to the actual demands of service, and by retrenching all expences which do not essentially contribute to the maintenance of the regal power, government might be supported, as far as regards its own disbursements, by this perpetual fund, as it now stands. Agreeable, therefore, to the proposed method, relative to a  
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contribution from Ireland to Great Britain, by the surplus over a stated sum, that is, over the present amount of this hereditary revenue, the collection of which was to be secured by permanent provisions, it is plain, that the regulating statutes of it, which are now temporary, would become perpetual ; that the Parliament of that country would surrender its power over a large share of this fund ; and that the practicability of government's supporting itself, independent of the people, would recur in its full strength. It is the part of wisdom to look forward to such consequences of public measures, as may be supposed the offspring of bad princes, and of the depravity of human nature.— If the sovereign should conspire with the nation of Great Britain to reduce the legislative importance of Ireland, all necessity of calling a Parliament there, would, by a permanent authority vested in the crown of collecting its own revenues, be completely superceded ; the constitutional maxim which enjoins the monarch to consult his people, *de rebus arduis regni*, would prove too feeble to enforce itself ; and Ireland would advance this antiquated principle in vain, against the strength of legal and undoubted prerogative. The debt of Ireland may be held forth as an argument against the possibility of such a consequence. Without a breach of public faith, it may be urged, the duties applicable to the payment of it, which are temporary, could not be annihilated ; but it is by no means incredible, that Great Britain, under the influence described, should esteem it a cheap purchase, to silence the voice of her sister at the expence of consolidating this debt with her own, and thereby cut off all pretence of murmur from the creditors of the public.



lic. A proposal therefore, to have the productive ability of the hereditary revenue in Ireland secured, by a permanent act for the collection of it, may well be regarded as one that ought to be very maturely weighed before it be embraced. Unfortunately, in this mode of providing a contribution from Ireland towards the expences of the empire, it will be found extremely difficult to institute any means equally permanent and effectual, without an objection of the like important nature with those already stated. It appears that, between two nations upon perfect terms of equality with each other, a contribution, enforced either by a positive or a circumstantial necessity, contradicts the principles of our constitution, and is derogatory to the rights of an independent state: where that nation which contributes thereby incurs the possibility of internal danger to its liberties, the measure becomes infinitely more alarming, and is rendered highly exceptionable, perhaps, both to one country and the other.

The first of these difficulties can only be obviated by having recourse to the common father of both people, whom our happy form of government has placed in the midst between the two kingdoms, and who has conspicuously manifested a tender and anxious concern for their united welfare. Such a grant to him from Ireland might, upon mature consideration, be devised, as would steer a middle course, between a breach of constitution, on the one hand, and the future possibility of annihilation to legislative existence, on the other; and such, if in any wise it can either immediately or indirectly apply to the assistance or relief of Great Britain, will effectually serve the purposes of the empire,  
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and form an equitable contribution from that country which enjoys her protection and support.

Whoever has had an opportunity of attentively considering the internal administration of affairs in Ireland, must have observed, that much discontent has continually arisen from the enormous load of pensions, and of the exceedings on concordatum, with which the establishment of that country is burdened; these furnish a ground of unceasing, and not unfounded, complaints. The pensions amount to upwards of ninety thousand pounds annually, and the exceedings on concordatum to above forty thousand; the latter are composed of particular rewards of services, that may be denominated public, which it is inconvenient to place within other departments of expenditure, and of douceurs, bestowed on objects of ministerial favour. Both pensions and concordatum are, strictly speaking, charges on the hereditary revenue, but this revenue, together with that arising from temporary grants, being thrown into an aggregate fund to discharge the general expences of government, the payments on those accounts, are, in reality, a deduction from this aggregate, which is always made good by parliament, not without violent murmurs against this application of the public money in most instances, and continual censures of the abuse of the power by which it is so directed. The public, or even the ministerial benefit, arising from those impositions, may safely be pronounced as wholly inadequate to the disbursement; the community reaps little or none, and the minister a very inconsiderable advantage from them. Notwithstanding the attacks constantly repeated every session against those charges, it is by no means probable that they will be diminished, and on the other hand, considering  
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their present large amount, and still more, that if a compact shall be formed, upon any scheme between the two nations, the revenue of Ireland will then become more especially an object of care to Great Britain, it is not more likely that they will be suffered to encrease ; taking them therefore as they at present stand, and supposing that they will not be hereafter augmented in the sum total, the only advantage to the administration in both kingdoms, must arise from supplying the vacancies as they occur. On a review of these vacancies for near sixteen years, that is from the commencement of Lord North's ministry to the time of the last return to the Irish Parliament, and then deducting from the whole sum given by these vacancies, that of such pensions as were granted to judges who retired, and to other public officers whose demands were not of grace, but of justice, and of such as were bestowed upon address of Parliament to the Crown, the remainder will afford such an average by the year as constitutes the real ministerial benefit, and it will be found a very poor equivalent indeed for the burdensome expence of this establishment, or even for the odium necessarily attendant on the measure of keeping it to its full amount. Taking them therefore at their present value, they would form a subsidy of near one hundred and forty thousand pounds annually, forty thousand of which, namely, the exceedings on concordatum, would immediately apply to the purposes of a contribution from Ireland, and the remainder as the lives of the pensioners shall fall in, or the pensions now on the list shall cease. This grant would, in point of emolument, far exceed what can be reasonably expected for many years from the surplus of the hereditary revenue, over and

above the sum of six hundred and fifty-six thousand pounds a year, and it would relieve both nations from the pressure of a dead and unproductive expence. Against such an application of this fund some objections may be started, which it is proper, in this place, to consider ; it may be said, that a part of the concordatum being paid to necessary, though minute services, these will suffer by an alienation of the funds for maintaining them. To this it is answered, that if they be of a public nature, there is no danger of their being overlooked or unprovided for by Parliament ; if of another, they ought to be suppressed at a juncture when the exigencies of Great-Britain and Ireland require the most provident attention to the encrease of the revenue in both countries ; the same may serve as a reply to a similar argument in favour of pensions ; some of these, undoubtedly, bear the stamp of public utility and of public justice ; such are the salaries of officers continued to them after they are incapable of duty, during the remainder of a life almost spent in the discharge of a laborious employment, and such are the grants to different branches of the royal family, who claim from every member and from every subject of the empire, proofs of their zeal and attachment, proportioned to their ability and to their gratitude, for the blessings they enjoy under a mild and beneficent government ; objects of this kind can never want, in Ireland, a suitable attention ; it is even more than possible, that the generous sense of humanity and of loyalty, for which that country is so remarkable, would extend the provision, in such cases, beyond the line which a prudent administration might think it necessary to draw, in the present circumstances of the pension list. There are some reasons which  
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may be presumed to maintain an influence in the breasts of ministers, in favour of the power to bestow these eleemosynary gifts on subjects of a very different complexion, but their authority may be considerably lessened, by remarking, that the present race of pensioners are not supposed liable to any other than the death of nature, and that by the help of a little prudent forecast, their places may be, in time, supplied by another generation, to the producing of which, the event of a commercial agreement between Great-Britain and Ireland will powerfully contribute. Besides the objections just stated, and which may be termed the objections of government to an alienation of the pension and concordatum fund, there are two others which may be called national, and which merit a separate consideration. It may be urged, on the part of Great-Britain, that a certain and a stated sum would not be a satisfactory provision from Ireland, proportioned to the growing prosperity of that kingdom, towards the support of the naval force of the empire, to which it is intended to be applied. It is pretty certain, that under the influence of a wise and rational treaty of commerce with Great-Britain, the surplus of the hereditary revenue in Ireland, over and above the annual sum of six hundred and fifty-six thousand pounds, would, in course of time, produce more than the aggregate of the pension and concordatum fund, but it is at least as certain, that for many years it would produce much less. If this difference could be so ascertained as to become the object of calculation, it would probably be found a more lucrative subject than the reversionary encrease of the hereditary revenue. By an accurate and well digested survey of the present trade of Ireland, no doubt as near an ap-

proach to certainty might be made upon this subject, as the nature of such a question can possibly admit. To those who are qualified and inclined to enter upon this disposition, it may not be improper here to observe, that there are some articles which form a large proportion of the hereditary revenue, and which are not great objects for an increase of commerce to operate on, consequently they will furnish very little to this reversionary income; these are quit and crown rents, amounting to upwards of sixty-five thousand, and hearth-money to above sixty-one thousand pounds annually. It will also be proper to consider, how far customs and imported excise may suffer a diminution, by lowering the duties upon the reciprocal admission of goods into each country, agreeable to the terms of the treaty.

As the duties upon imports into Ireland form the chief part of the commercial branch of the hereditary revenue there, the most productive encrease of this revenue must arise from an additional importation. It will therefore be worthy attention in an estimate of this kind, to consider whether a large augmentation of imported articles into Ireland may be reasonably expected, under a system by which the commerce and manufactures of that country are proposed to be extended. But whether there shall appear, or not, a probability of an increase to the hereditary revenue, more lucrative in expectation than the pension and concordatum fund in possession, it may justly be represented, on the other side, that some advantage would arise to Great-Britain from the very circumstance of the contributions being known and ascertained in its amount; the application of it would be more determinate, and the service for  
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which it is provided would receive, from a fixed and permanent subsidy, a more beneficial support than from one, by its nature, subject to continual fluctuations. The principle upon which a provision from the increase of this revenue appears to have been selected, namely, that it will be one proportioned to the growing prosperity of Ireland, and therefore satisfactory, does not, upon examination, justify this preference, or the conclusion which has been drawn from it. On the contrary, an encrease of this revenue in Ireland, equal to the amount of the pension and concordatum fund, that is, to one hundred and forty thousand pounds annually, would manifest such a flourishing state of the resources of that country, as must represent that, as a contribution, very ill proportioned to its growing prosperity. A consequence might, besides, follow such a bargain, drove between the two kingdoms at the time of establishing the compact, which might operate hereafter very much to the disadvantage of the empire. The people of Ireland might be induced to rely upon the very terms of the original agreement, and however their capacity of assisting Great Britain may be enlarged in time of peace, when it must certainly be at the highest, they might deem it sufficient to comply with the strict tenor of the article; whereas, by avoiding the appearance of a compulsory obligation upon this head, proposed by one nation, and entered into by the other, and left to the natural impulse of their own feelings, deeply interested in the safety and prosperity of the empire, there can be very little doubt, that nothing short of inability would bound their efforts to maintain and augment it.

On the part of Ireland, a national objection may also be raised to such an appropriation of the pension

sion and concordatum fund as is here proposed. It may be urged, that after this alienation, the crown will retain a power of imposing upon the hereditary revenue a burden of equal weight, and of the like nature. This must be acknowledged, if it cannot be satisfactorily obviated, to be a difficulty completely formidable; to leave the evil complained of in its full capacity of recurring would be, to the last degree, unwise and precipitate. But if it should be judged expedient to relinquish this power of adding to the burdens of the public in that country, that is, in other words, if the hereditary revenue should be surrendered by the crown into the disposal and management of Parliament there, all the strength and consequence of this impediment would be totally annihilated. To enable the crown to form a just estimate of this measure, it may be necessary to value the advantages which it at present enjoys, or ever can derive, from a property so circumstanced as the hereditary revenue of Ireland. In the first place, it must be remarked, that the sole and exclusive right in the crown to dispose of this property, has been frequently combated by the lawyers of that country; they have asserted, that the grants conveying the hereditary revenue, excepting a very small part, which is vested properly in the crown, have, for the most part, in terms sufficiently explicit, appropriated the duties to general public uses, and that when they have not done so, a special exemption from gift, grant, lease, or pension, has been purposely inserted, to preclude the crown from a private application of the produce of these duties. It is, therefore, possible, that a question on this right may, in time, be agitated, and the present suspense of it renders it prudent to abstain from any other, than such an exercise  
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of the power as bears the appearance of general service. The appropriation of it to the peculiar maintenance of the sovereign, may, therefore, be esteemed impracticable, and the advantages resulting to the crown, from the possession of it, may be looked on as merely relative to the government of the kingdom, and to the administration of the regal authority. Besides the imposition of pensions and concordatum on this fund, there are continual drafts made on it, in virtue of king's letters, as they are called. These are, in fact, grants of the crown, for the most part, to different public services in Ireland; they are principally confined to such as the king is supposed more immediately concerned in;—the building, or the repair of custom-houses, and the support of royal foundations, engross the largest share. But there are many instances of grants in this department, solicited and procured by strong applications in behalf of favourite schemes, that do not always redound to the honour of the crown, or the benefit of the community. It does not even appear that government is interested in the promoting of them, except in a very subordinate degree, by gratifying the individuals at whose instance this species of royal bounty is extended.—Such are the principal, if not the only advantages, which the crown enjoys, or probably can ever derive, from a dominion over the hereditary revenue in Ireland; and if it can be reasonably presumed, that by surrendering it into the hands of Parliament, on the present occasion, all these advantages may, in substance, be preserved, and an additional power of a much more interesting nature be acquired, the great obstruction to an adjustment of this important concern, in the manner described, will disappear, and leave the subject to an impartial and just examination.

mination. It has already been argued, and certainly upon the most solid grounds, that, with respect to the public services defrayed by the exceedings on concordatum, there cannot remain a doubt of Parliament's adopting them, as a part of the establishments; that, with respect to such pensions as compose a part of the appannage to the branches of the royal family, and such as are the stipendiary reward of worn-out services, no distrust can be entertained of the loyalty or the generosity of those, whose duty it would become to provide them; as little can it be supposed, that the public works of their own country, the exigencies of which are every day under their own inspection, can remain unnoticed and unsupported, by the men whose province it must be to watch over them. If confidence be denied to a people, in the management of their own immediate concerns, it must be folly to entrust them, as a party, in those of another nation, where prudence and good faith are so indispensibly requisite. Should it ever be deemed expedient to accept from Ireland the whole, or any part of the fund now absorbed by these two impositions, as a reasonable contribution from that country, on the event of a commercial agreement, the mode of negotiating that transfer may be so regulated, as to avoid even the speculative breach of equality between the two nations, or the more substantial danger to the constitution, in either country. The grant might be made directly to his majesty, as an equivalent to the crown for a surrender of the perpetual revenue now vested in it: he would then stand the distinguished umpire and the glorious benefactor to both his kingdoms. Such a power of extending the royal grace to all his people, would, in his mind, outweigh the whole mass of unproductive advantages, supposed to issue from  
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a dominion over the distribution of a fund, strictly limited to general uses; another opportunity of manifesting to the world his magnanimous reliance upon the loyalty and attachment of his subjects would be embraced, and the same reign would hand down to future times, two rare examples of a sovereign reposing, with a generous confidence, upon the grateful affection of an empire, rendered happy through his paternal care. To the Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland, an opportunity of equal importance would also present itself. The latter would have the glory of rescuing their country from all apprehensions of future danger to the constitution, and, at the same time an occasion of displaying that liberal sense of a benefit conferred, by which nations, as well as individuals, are characterized. That of Great Britain might lay hold of the same conjuncture, to manifest the cordial attachment with which they desire to bind the sister kingdom to an equal and reciprocal communication of good offices; they would avoid the odium of defacing the statute books with the record of something like a tribute on one side, and of somewhat not unlike the demand of it on the other; they might regulate the payment of the contribution from Ireland, when they should acquire the right of doing so, agreeable to the wise and salutary terms prescribed by the late treaty upon that head. How far they might, or should deem it incumbent on them, as the representative of a great nation, to proceed in their returns of gratitude to their Prince, it would ill become an individual to suggest: too much, perhaps, has been already advanced, upon subjects of this delicate and comprehensive nature; it must be equally presumptuous and unnecessary to hazard more.

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